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Abstract
In this essay, I (Hereafter: the writer)2 will attempt to indicate necessity of
minimalistic position to the legal language. Moreover, the writer will transfer this
conservative position to legal language in theocracy and argue that religious legal
language in theocracy is involved Legal Stammer Argument.3
AMinimalist Religious Language
Straightforwardly, the writer is interested in a minimalist religious language, e.g.
Phillips' view, since, it is not only it could be consisted with the most minimalist
desire of legal language and other areas of the writer's philosophy, but also, the
writer thinks this aspect could explain religious language. This perspective could be
as a criterion undisputedly, owing to fact that, minimalist view could not be misused
in different religious or non-religious attitudes and this misusing could not be to
extent other subjects of the philosophy of religion. The writer believes that if one
considers the meaning beyond this theory then the one will agree that religious
language is unique and the other labels to the school will collapse the weight of
religions among believers and so, their disadvantages outweigh advantages. One the
most famous philosophers to minimalist theory of religious language is D. Z. Phillips
and his works have been known as a non-cognitivist's position and the minimalist
position respectably,4 it seems that Phillips' ideas are too widespread among many
books and articles and there is more than a bite changing of his view on the subject,5
but, he is admitted that his view on the debate has been influenced by Wittgenstein's
works.6 Philosophers who have been affected by the Wittgenstein view introduce
their attitudes in different terms: "forms of life", "unique", "language games", etc.7
Phillips clearly believes that talking on God and its meaning is not about "object",
"matters of fact" or "a kind of reality", because, it "cannot be found outside religion",
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but it is come from "religious discourse itself" or a "religious tradition" and this
feature of religious language possess "internal relation to religious discourse" and
finally, "theology is the grammar of religious discourse" and so, has to remain
"personal".8 This position on religious language could be interpreted as "sui generis",
also, we could identified sui generis as unique to this school.9 However, there are
other objections to this theory that it appears to the writer's mind that he replies
them very successfully.10 For instance, he insists that his view is not about "belief" or
"unbelief", but it has "nothing of the truth or falsity of the religion".11
Legal Stammer Argument
Legal language includes some questions viz what is semantic sting?12 Or what is
consequences of vagueness in law?13 Also, there are some other sort of question on
the law and language.14
However, the writer only concentrates on applying the legal language in theocracy
and it is clear that theocracy applies a religious language in law that means if
theocracy applies non-religious language, the writer's argument does not attack it.
Keep in mind that the writer very conservatively has used minimalist theory of
religious language that Phillips' unique theory is a sample of it and so, the writer only
object this claim that legal language shall to be descriptive and theocracy could not
satisfy it.15 The writer insists the main innovative claim of this essay as follow:
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10 For objection to minimalist theory of religious language, see: 1. Language game objection (Oppy &
Trakakis, 2007) , Philips' reply: "form of life" and "many language-games", and it is not "esoteric
games", "astrology", or "nonsense" (Phillips, 1993, pp. 31,57,61,69,76), another reply (Burley, 2011), 2.
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consciousness (Burley, 2011, pp. 114-5), 4. Denying God as "metaphysical reality" objection (Oppy &
Trakakis, 2007, pp. 107-8), reply as a distinction between metaphysical and practical uses of language
(Burley, 2011, pp. 115-6), 5. Biological or cultural aspect of the form of life objection (Addis, 2001, pp.
88-90), 6. Tillich's internalism (Kurtén, 2007), reply as a different category (Scott, 2017), reply as the
thin problem (Phillips, 2007, pp. 113-8).
11 For this claim, see: (Phillips, 1993, p. 8) , (Burley, 2011, pp. 105-6) , (Hick, 1990, p. 96) , another
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12 For semantic sting, see: (Halpin, 2010, pp. 614-5) , (Endicott, 2016) , semantic objectivity of law
(Kramer, 2007, pp. 67-82).
13 For vagueness in law, see: (Marmor, 2011, pp. 136-50)
14 For an introduction to legal language, see: (Marmor, 2011, pp. 136-159), (Endicott, 2016).
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X= God will forgive the bankrupts on judgment day.
Y= The state will forgive the bankrupts in the last days of every year.
Z= Ana is bankrupt and she believes in Monotheistic religions that believe in
both God and the judgment day.
 Z has to pay her debt to a bank,
 Z knows that if she would not pay her debt,
 But she knows that if she does not pay her debt she will face two matters,
 Z knows X,
 Z knows Y,
 Z knows that she is a sinner but X,
 Z knows that she knows she is guilty but Y,
 If X, Z after X, will not remain sinner,
 If X, then Z will be transformed from a sinner to an innocent,
 Because the sin of Z depends on the willingness of God to forgive Z,
 It means both sin and God come from otherworldly concepts and realities that
have reciprocal relations with each other and so, the sin depends on God,
 But, if Y, Z after Y will remain guilty,
 We know that the state will forgive Z legally,
 But we know that Z will remain guilty,
 Because guilty of Z does not depend on the willingness of the state to forgive Z
morally,
 It seems that we could find out concepts and realities of the thiswordly
guiltiest of Z,
 It means that we know that Y,
 So, we know that Z will be forgiven after Y legally,
 Also, we know that Z will remain guilty after Y morally.
 As a first consequence, X is an example of unique religious language that is
otherworldly and so, Z will be forgiven and become innocent, since, the sin
depends on God,
 As a second consequence, Y is an example of a non-religious language that is
thiswordly and so, Z will be forgiven legally and remain guilty morally. Due to
the fact that they are thiswordly and they are different aspect of the bankrupt.
We could show the claim up in other ways:
X= God will forgive the bankrupts in the judgment day.
Y= The state will forgive the bankrupts in the last days of every year.
Z= Ana is bankrupt and she does NOT believe in Monotheistic religions that
she does NOT believe in both God and judgment day.
 Z has to pay her debt to a bank,
 Z knows that if she would not pay her debt,
 But she does NOT know that if she does not pay her debt she will face two
matters,
 Z does not know X,
 Z does not know Y,
 Z does not know that she is a sinner but X,
 Z knows that she is guilty if she does bankrupts, and so, rationally she would
NOT do bankrupt, but Y,
 If X, Z after X, will not remain sinner,
 If X, then Z will be transformed from a sinner to an innocent,
 Because the sin of Z depends on the willingness of God to forgive Z,
 It means both sin and God come from otherworldly concepts and realities that
have reciprocal relations with each other and so, the sin depends on God,
 But, if Y, Z after Y will remain guilty,
 We know that the state will forgive Z legally,
 But we know that Z will remain guilty,
 Because guilty of Z does not depend on the willingness of the state to forgive Z
morally,
 It seems that we could find out concepts and realities of the thiswordly
guiltiest of Z,
 It means that we know that Y,
 So, we know that Z will be forgiven after Y legally,
 Also, we know that Z will remain guilty after Y morally.
 As a first consequence, X is an example of unique religious language that is
otherworldly and so, Z will be forgiven and become innocent, since, the sin
depends on God,
 As a second consequence, Y is an example of a non-religious language that is
thiswordly and so, Z will be forgiven legally and remain guilty morally. Due to
the fact that they are thiswordly and they are different aspect of the bankrupt.
But, rationally she would NOT do bankrupt, because she does not know Y.
The claim shows that applying different beliefs for religious concepts and entities
does NOT lead to different concepts and entities in religious language. It is
enormously clear that applying of religious language is independent of mental or
epistemic states. Although, we clearly discover first of all, we could grasp different
aspect of a thiswordly matter, but also, that using different beliefs for non-religious
concepts and entities lead to different concepts and entities in non-religious language.
The above mentioned thesis is religious language is not descriptive, but, one could
perceive there are normative languages those could bearer of descriptive one. We
know that we require a legal language which could fit bankruptcy is illegal and so, if
it does not indicate that the bankruptcy is illegal it could not be a law. Imagine we
have to apply a law of Applied Physics to civic law because it is necessary to build
dams. Remember, we know that religious language could not be descriptive and so,
legal language could not be religious language. Let the writer formalizes his
argument:
Φ = Descriptive property
α= Religious language
β = Legal language
Θ= empty
N1 = First descriptive legal code or provision
To Nn= infinite descriptive one
 Α is Θ of Φ and call this the first thesis,
 But, β needs to be Φ,
 Because, β has to be bearer of N1 to Nn,
 If N1 is a descriptive discipline like Applied Physics, then. β has to be bearer of
N1,
 So, β has to Φ,
 Α could not be Φ,
 Altogether, β could not adopted from α.
 ╞
 Φ ∈ α iff α ≠ β because β is Θ.
As mentioned the before lines it is clear that if the legal language would be a
normative language that could be bearer of descriptive sciences and disciplines such
as Applied Physics and Engineering then it has not to be the religious one.
Conclusion
In this essay, first of all, we show some possibilities of Phillips' interpretations of
religious language, and then, the writer argues that most of them are inapplicable to
Phillips' philosophy of religious language. Moreover, the writer presents the
bankrupt argument in two different ways to claim that religious language is unique.
So, normative language like legal language could not be the religious one.
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